The CIA fundamentally changed after 9/11—from an intelligence collection agency constrained by post-Watergate reforms into an assassination bureau. Kiriakou argues the Democratic Party's use of superdelegates deliberately suppresses populist candidates, mirroring how insider control corrupted institutions that once felt genuinely purposeful to those who served them.
Key Moments
Theo Von
“it used to feel hopeful and now it feels um it's will we survive? It feel there's something else. It's not a hope. I don't even know if it it's somewhat of a fear, but it's more of an uncertainty.”
Reflecting on how loss of faith in democratic institutions—typified by rigged primaries and superdelegates—has shifted American psychology from hope to fear
“911 changed everything and it changed it permanently in a bunch of different ways. After 9/11, Bush is just like, just kill everybody you want.”
Explaining how Executive Order 12333 was amended post-9/11 to eliminate restrictions on assassination that had existed since the 1970s Church Committee
John Kiriakou is a former CIA officer turned author and speaker, best known for whistleblowing on the CIA's use of torture. He brings firsthand experience from decades in intelligence work, including time as a leadership analyst on Iraq and participation in counterterrorism operations. His new book, The Ultimate Guide to CIA Skills, Tactics, and Techniques, draws on his career trajectory from recruitment through field operations.
Takeaways
1
Superdelegates were engineered to prevent populism After McGovern's 1972 loss, Democrats instituted superdelegates—roughly 1,500 party insiders who automatically become convention delegates. This system directly contradicts democratic voting: Bernie Sanders won West Virginia and Wyoming in 2016 but Clinton won literally every delegate from those states. Republicans have no equivalent system, which is why outsider candidates like Trump can win nominations.
2
Geopolitical strategy operates across decades, not election cycles Kiriakou illustrates this with Stalin's pre-Yalta espionage: having a spy in the White House enabled Stalin to learn FDR was dying and deliberately schedule talks to exhaust him further. The U.S. operates on two- to four-year windows; adversaries plan generationally. This structural disadvantage compounds when institutions lose their sense of shared purpose.
3
9/11 repealed Cold War restrictions on assassination Executive Order 12333 (1976) explicitly banned the CIA from conducting assassinations, a reform born from Church Committee revelations. Bush administration amended this post-9/11, creating offices like the Special Activities Division whose sole function was to deploy kill teams on rotating lists of targets. Intelligence collection stopped; the agency became a stateless execution apparatus.
4
CIA recruitment was covert academia infiltration Until 1993, the CIA placed undercover officers in universities to identify and recruit candidates. Dr. Gerald Post posed as a George Washington University professor while actually running recruitment for the agency—a tactic that would become illegal after the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. This created an organic funnel from academia into intelligence work that modern online applications have since replaced.
5
Insider control corrupts institutions built on idealism Kiriakou describes walking through CIA headquarters with profound pride—feeling part of something larger. That changed after 9/11 and after witnessing superdelegate manipulation. When people sense institutions are rigged by unaccountable insiders, they lose the psychological investment that makes those institutions function. Hope becomes fear; participation becomes withdrawal.